Debate: How much do animals matter?

Equal consideration of interests

The suffering of any being that can suffer counts, and counts equally with the like suffering of any other. Species alone is no reason to discount it.

Best argument

Jeremy Bentham wrote: 'The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?' Peter Singer argues that favouring humans simply because they are human is speciesism, a prejudice parallel to racism and sexism: it gives weight to a morally irrelevant biological category. Equal consideration does not mean equal treatment, since a pig has no interest in voting, but it means a pig's pain is as bad as a human's equal pain.

Strongest objection

Critics argue that humans have morally relevant capacities that most animals lack: rationality, moral agency, complex plans for the future, membership in a moral community. These, not mere species, justify special treatment.

The reply

Singer answers with the argument from marginal cases: some humans lack these capacities too, yet we rightly give their suffering full weight. If capacities are what matter, consistency requires the same for animals with comparable capacities.

Defended by

Jeremy Bentham, Peter Singer

Animal rights

Animals that are 'subjects of a life' have rights that may not be violated, even for good consequences. Using them as resources is wrong in itself.

Best argument

Tom Regan argues that a being with beliefs, desires, memory, a sense of its own future and a welfare of its own has inherent value. Such beings may not be treated merely as means, just as humans may not. This explains why it would be wrong to cause an animal great suffering even if it produced more total happiness, which a utilitarian might permit.

Strongest objection

Where is the line? Regan focused on mammals over a year old; fish, insects and other animals raise harder questions. Rights theory also has trouble with conflicts, such as predators in the wild.

Defended by

Tom Regan, Christine Korsgaard, Gary Francione

Indirect duties only

Animals do not have moral standing in their own right. Our duties regarding animals are really duties to humans or to our own character.

Best argument

Immanuel Kant held that only rational beings are ends in themselves. Yet he argued that cruelty to animals is wrong because it damages our humanity: 'he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men'. Contractualists add that morality is an agreement among those who can make agreements, which animals cannot.

Strongest objection

This seems to locate the wrong in the wrong place. Kicking a dog is wrong because of what it does to the dog, not because it might make you rude to your neighbours. And it implies that cruelty to animals would be fine if it had no effect on the person doing it.

Defended by

Immanuel Kant, René Descartes, Peter Carruthers

Graded moral status

Animals matter morally in their own right, but less than humans, and some animals more than others, depending on their capacities.

Best argument

This tracks most people's considered views: it is wrong to cause animals needless suffering, but it may be acceptable to use them in some ways for serious human benefit. Shelly Kagan argues for a hierarchy of moral status based on psychological capacities, without reducing animals to nothing.

Strongest objection

Hierarchies have a troubling history. And if status depends on capacities, the view seems to imply that some humans have lower status than others, which most defenders want to avoid.

Defended by

Shelly Kagan, Aristotle

Where you stand

Is it permissible to eat animals?

Choose one to see how people answer.

For the full background, variations and open questions, read the entry: Do animals have moral rights?.