The drowning child
You would ruin your expensive shoes to save a child drowning in front of you. Then why not spend the same money to save a child dying far away?
- Reading time
- 5 min
- Difficulty
- Introductory
- Branch
- Ethics
- First posed
- Peter Singer, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1972
The setup
On your way to work, you pass a shallow pond. A small child has fallen in and is drowning. You could wade in and pull the child out easily. But you are wearing new shoes and an expensive suit that would be ruined, and you would be late for work.
Of course you should save the child. Anyone who walked past to protect their shoes would be considered a monster.
Peter Singer used this case, in a 1972 paper written in response to a famine in what is now Bangladesh, to make a startling argument. Children die every day of preventable causes: malaria, malnutrition, diarrhoeal disease. Donations to effective charities can prevent some of those deaths at a cost comparable to a ruined suit. If you are obliged to save the drowning child at that cost, why are you not equally obliged to save a distant child at the same cost?
Singer's principle, in brief: if you can prevent something very bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, you ought to do it. If that is right, most people in wealthy countries are doing something seriously wrong every time they spend money on things they do not need.
Why it matters
The argument is one of the most influential in modern applied ethics. It helped inspire the effective altruism movement, which encourages people to give significant portions of their income to the most cost-effective charities.
It also exposes a gap between what most people believe in the pond case and how almost everyone lives. Either the argument is wrong somewhere, or most of us are falling far short of our moral obligations.
Key terms
- Effective altruismA movement that uses evidence and careful reasoning to work out how to do the most good with a given amount of time or money, and then acts on it.
- SupererogationActs that are good to do but go beyond what duty requires, such as heroic sacrifices.
- Demandingness objectionThe objection that a moral theory, often utilitarianism, asks too much of us, for example by requiring us to give away nearly everything to help others.
- UtilitarianismThe moral theory that the right action is the one that produces the greatest total wellbeing, counting everyone's equally.
- Moral distanceThe question of whether physical or social distance makes any difference to our obligations to help someone.
The positions
Singer is right
There is no morally relevant difference between the drowning child and a child dying far away. We are obliged to give much more than we do.
Distance and directness matter
The cases differ in morally relevant ways: immediacy, certainty, and being the only one who can help.
Charity is good but not required
Helping distant strangers is admirable, but not a strict obligation. It goes beyond the call of duty.
Charity misses the point
The real problem is political and structural. Individual charity can treat symptoms while leaving injustice in place.
Arguments and objections
Singer is right
- Best argument
- Distance does not change the badness of a child's death. Neither does the fact that others could help too: if ten people stood by the pond and nine walked past, you would still be obliged to save the child. If the cost to you is small compared with a life, you must pay it. Singer argued that this applies until giving more would cause you comparable suffering.
- Strongest objection
- The demandingness objection: taken seriously, the principle requires giving until you are nearly as poor as those you help. Morality cannot demand that we give up all our personal projects and relationships.
- The reply
- Singer accepts that the strong version is demanding but argues that even the weaker version, giving up only what is of no moral importance, such as luxuries, requires far more than most people give. He has proposed a more modest public standard, such as giving a percentage of income scaled to how much you earn.
Distance and directness matter
- Best argument
- In the pond case, you are the only person able to help, the need is right in front of you, and success is certain. With distant poverty, millions could help, the causal chain is long and uncertain, and the problem is ongoing rather than a single emergency. Frances Kamm and others have argued that proximity can matter morally, not just psychologically.
- Strongest objection
- Each difference can be removed in a variation. Imagine a child drowning far away, whom you could save by pressing a button with certainty. Most people still feel obliged.
Charity is good but not required
- Best argument
- Morality distinguishes duties, which we must fulfil, from supererogatory acts, which are good but optional. Saving the drowning child is a duty because the need is urgent and you are directly present. Giving to famine relief is generous, praiseworthy, but optional. A morality with no room for personal life is not one humans could live by.
- Strongest objection
- Why should the line between duty and generosity fall exactly where it is convenient for the comfortable? To the child who dies, the distinction makes no difference.
Charity misses the point
- Best argument
- Some critics argue that global poverty is largely caused by unjust institutions, trade rules and history, including the actions of wealthy nations. The obligation, on this view, is not just to give but to change those structures. Thomas Pogge argues that the wealthy are not merely failing to help but actively contributing to harm.
- Strongest objection
- Structural change is slow and uncertain; malaria nets save lives now. Supporters of effective giving argue that both approaches can go together.
Who argued what
- Singer is right Peter Singer, Peter Unger, William MacAskill
- Distance and directness matter Frances Kamm, Garrett Cullity
- Charity is good but not required Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf
- Charity misses the point Thomas Pogge, Amia Srinivasan
Variations
The Bugatti
Peter Unger imagined Bob, who has invested his savings in a rare, uninsured vintage car. A runaway trolley is heading toward a child. Bob can divert it onto the track where his car is parked, destroying his savings. Almost everyone says he must. Unger argued that this shows we are obliged to give far more of our wealth to save distant lives.
The button
A button on your desk, if pressed, sends 50 dollars that will, with certainty, save a child's life on the other side of the world. Pressing it is as easy as wading into the pond. Do you feel the obligation more or less than with the pond? Why?
Go deeper
How much does it cost to save a life?
The charity evaluator GiveWell estimates that its top recommended charities, such as those distributing insecticide-treated bed nets against malaria, can save a life for a few thousand US dollars. Estimates change over time and carry real uncertainty, but they are far higher than the cost of a suit, which strengthens some critics' objection that the analogy understates the sacrifice. Defenders reply that the moral point survives: a few thousand dollars is still small compared with a life.
Schools of thought: Utilitarianism
Related ideas
Further reading and sources
- EncyclopediaStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: search “Singer famine affluence morality”
- WikipediaFamine, Affluence, and Morality
- BookThe Life You Can Save, Peter Singer
- BookDoing Good Better, William MacAskill
- BookLiving High and Letting Die, Peter Unger
Open questions
- Why does a child in front of you feel so different from one far away?
- How much would you have to give to feel you had done enough?
- Can morality ask you to give up the things that make your life your own?