Must we save distant strangers?
Is the distant child's claim on you as strong as the drowning one's?
I
Singer is right
There is no morally relevant difference between the drowning child and a child dying far away. We are obliged to give much more than we do.
- Best argument
- Distance does not change the badness of a child's death. Neither does the fact that others could help too: if ten people stood by the pond and nine walked past, you would still be obliged to save the child. If the cost to you is small compared with a life, you must pay it. Singer argued that this applies until giving more would cause you comparable suffering.
- Strongest objection
- The demandingness objection: taken seriously, the principle requires giving until you are nearly as poor as those you help. Morality cannot demand that we give up all our personal projects and relationships.
- The reply
- Singer accepts that the strong version is demanding but argues that even the weaker version, giving up only what is of no moral importance, such as luxuries, requires far more than most people give. He has proposed a more modest public standard, such as giving a percentage of income scaled to how much you earn.
- Defended by
- Peter Singer, Peter Unger, William MacAskill
II
Distance and directness matter
The cases differ in morally relevant ways: immediacy, certainty, and being the only one who can help.
- Best argument
- In the pond case, you are the only person able to help, the need is right in front of you, and success is certain. With distant poverty, millions could help, the causal chain is long and uncertain, and the problem is ongoing rather than a single emergency. Frances Kamm and others have argued that proximity can matter morally, not just psychologically.
- Strongest objection
- Each difference can be removed in a variation. Imagine a child drowning far away, whom you could save by pressing a button with certainty. Most people still feel obliged.
- Defended by
- Frances Kamm, Garrett Cullity
III
Charity is good but not required
Helping distant strangers is admirable, but not a strict obligation. It goes beyond the call of duty.
- Best argument
- Morality distinguishes duties, which we must fulfil, from supererogatory acts, which are good but optional. Saving the drowning child is a duty because the need is urgent and you are directly present. Giving to famine relief is generous, praiseworthy, but optional. A morality with no room for personal life is not one humans could live by.
- Strongest objection
- Why should the line between duty and generosity fall exactly where it is convenient for the comfortable? To the child who dies, the distinction makes no difference.
- Defended by
- Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf
IV
Charity misses the point
The real problem is political and structural. Individual charity can treat symptoms while leaving injustice in place.
- Best argument
- Some critics argue that global poverty is largely caused by unjust institutions, trade rules and history, including the actions of wealthy nations. The obligation, on this view, is not just to give but to change those structures. Thomas Pogge argues that the wealthy are not merely failing to help but actively contributing to harm.
- Strongest objection
- Structural change is slow and uncertain; malaria nets save lives now. Supporters of effective giving argue that both approaches can go together.
- Defended by
- Thomas Pogge, Amia Srinivasan
For the full background, variations and open questions, read the entry: The drowning child.