QuestionsXXI

How do you know anything at all?

You believe you are reading a screen. Can you rule out every way that belief might be false? If not, do you really know it?

Reading time
4 min
Difficulty
Intermediate
Branch
Knowledge
First posed
Pyrrho of Elis, c. 300 BCE; Sextus Empiricus, c. 200 CE; René Descartes, 1641

The question

You know your own name. You know there is a world outside your window. You know that the sun will rise tomorrow and that you had breakfast this morning. Or do you?

The skeptic asks a simple question: how do you know? Your belief that there is a world outside depends on your senses, which sometimes deceive you. Your memory of breakfast could be mistaken. You cannot step outside your own experience to check whether it matches reality. And if you cannot rule out the possibility that you are dreaming, deceived by a demon, or a the brain in a vat, it seems you cannot know anything about the external world at all.

Philosophers call this radical skepticism. It is not the everyday doubt of a careful person, but a challenge to the very possibility of knowledge. Few people are skeptics in practice. The difficulty is that the arguments for skepticism are surprisingly hard to refute.

Why it matters

Skepticism is the engine of epistemology, the study of knowledge. Every theory of knowledge must explain where the skeptic goes wrong, or admit that they are right.

It also has practical echoes. In an age of misinformation, deepfakes and filter bubbles, the question of how we know what we know, and whom to trust, is not only academic.

Key terms

  • EpistemologyThe branch of philosophy that studies knowledge: what it is, how we get it, and how far it reaches.
  • SkepticismIn philosophy, the view that we know much less than we think, or nothing at all, or the practice of doubting claims to knowledge.
  • JustificationHaving good reasons or evidence for a belief, so that it is reasonable to hold.
  • Closure principleThe principle that if you know something, and know that it implies something else, you know that other thing too. Sceptical arguments often rely on it.
  • FoundationalismThe view that knowledge has a structure like a building: some basic beliefs are justified without depending on others, and everything else rests on them.
  • ContextualismIn epistemology, the view that the standards for counting as 'knowing' shift with the context of conversation, so that the sceptic raises the standards rather than refuting ordinary knowledge.

The positions

Position I

Radical skepticism

We do not know anything about the external world, because we cannot rule out scenarios in which all our experiences are misleading.

Position II

Common sense (Moore)

We know many things about the world, and any argument concluding otherwise must have a false premise.

Position III

Contextualism

Whether you 'know' something depends on the standards in play. In everyday contexts, you know you have hands; in a philosophy seminar, the standards rise and you do not.

Position IV

Deny closure

You can know you have hands without knowing you are not a brain in a vat. Knowledge is not closed under known implication.

Arguments and objections

Radical skepticism

Best argument
The argument is short. If you know you have hands, you know you are not a handless brain in a vat. You do not know you are not a brain in a vat, since everything would seem the same if you were. So you do not know you have hands. Each premise seems true, and the logic is valid.
Strongest objection
The conclusion is unbelievable, and no one can actually live by it. Many philosophers think we have more reason to believe we know we have hands than to believe any premise of a clever argument to the contrary.

Common sense (Moore)

Best argument
G. E. Moore famously held up his hands before an audience and declared that here was one hand, and here was another. He argued that he was more certain of this than of any premise in a skeptical argument. So rather than accept the conclusion, we should reverse the argument: I know I have hands, so I know I am not a brain in a vat.
Strongest objection
To many this seems to beg the question. The skeptic is asking how you know you have hands, and Moore simply repeats that he does.
The reply
Moore's defenders argue that not every piece of knowledge needs a further argument behind it. Some things are known directly, and it is the skeptic who owes us a reason to doubt them.

Contextualism

Best argument
The word 'know' is context-sensitive, like 'tall' or 'flat'. When a skeptic raises the possibility of a demon, they shift the conversation to extremely demanding standards. Both the skeptic and the ordinary person can be right, each in their own context.
Strongest objection
It seems to change the subject. The skeptic wants to know whether we really know, and being told that 'know' means different things in different conversations does not answer that.

Deny closure

Best argument
Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick argued that knowledge requires 'tracking' the truth: if it were false, you would not believe it. Your belief that you have hands tracks the truth (if you had no hands, you would notice). Your belief that you are not a brain in a vat does not. So you know the first without knowing the second.
Strongest objection
It produces 'abominable conjunctions', as Keith DeRose put it: 'I know I have hands, but I do not know I am not a handless brain in a vat.' That sounds incoherent.

Who argued what

  • Radical skepticism Sextus Empiricus, Peter Unger, Barry Stroud
  • Common sense (Moore) G. E. Moore, Thomas Reid
  • Contextualism Keith DeRose, David Lewis, Stewart Cohen
  • Deny closure Fred Dretske, Robert Nozick

Where you stand

Can you know the world outside your mind exists?

Choose one to see how people answer.

Variations

The dream argument

In the Meditations, René Descartes observed that there are no sure signs by which to distinguish being awake from being asleep. Zhuangzi, in ancient China, told of dreaming he was a butterfly and waking unsure whether he was a man who had dreamed of being a butterfly or a butterfly now dreaming of being a man.

The Pyrrhonist's tranquillity

Ancient Pyrrhonists did not argue that knowledge was impossible, which would itself be a dogmatic claim. They suspended judgment on everything, and reported that tranquillity followed 'as a shadow follows a body'. Their skepticism was a way of life, not a thesis.

Go deeper

Foundations or a web?

If every belief needs a justification, and every justification is another belief, we face a regress. Foundationalists say the regress ends in basic beliefs that need no further justification, like 'I seem to see red'. Coherentists say beliefs are justified by fitting together into a mutually supporting web. Infinitists say the regress need not end. Each answer has its own problems, and the regress problem goes back to the ancient skeptic Agrippa.

Schools of thought: Skepticism, Rationalism, Empiricism

Further reading and sources

Open questions

  • What would it take to prove you are not dreaming right now?
  • Is certainty necessary for knowledge, or is good evidence enough?
  • If you could never tell the difference, would it matter whether the world were real?